Lede
On paper it’s “safety”. At the gate it looks like ID-for-everything and less freedom for everyone.

What does not make sense

• Years of drift on child safety, then a scramble that outsources trust to third-party age checkers holding piles of sensitive data.
• Saying “this is for children” while making adults prove their age to read lawful content.
• Calling it “assurance” when it often means uploading IDs, selfies, or face scans to companies you did not choose.
• Pretending bans end curiosity. They move it. Children route around blocks. They always have.
• Treating encryption as optional. Safety without private communications is theatre.

Sense check

Children need protection. Full stop. But protection is not a wall that scans every adult. Protection is design, education, and enforcement that respect rights. The Online Safety Act turns the gate into the battleground. That’s the wrong layer. Keep the home private and empowered. Keep the platform accountable. Keep the state out of everyone’s pockets unless there is a warrant.

The drift you feel

• “Temporary” age checks become permanent.
• “Only for the worst content” becomes “why not more.”
• “Highly effective” means “upload your face, your ID, or both.”
• Data piles grow. Breaches follow. Trust doesn’t.

What action looks like (that actually helps)

• Private by design age checks. Anonymous tokens issued on-device, no ID retention, independent audits, clear deletion.
• Parental controls in the home, not at the border. Easy, unintrusive tools set by parents, with proper education and default off for adults.
• Focus on platforms’ duties. UX that does not recommend harm, real moderation for illegal content, fast appeals, and transparent logs.
• Protect encryption. No scanning of private messages. If the state needs data, use warrants and due process.
• Stop scope-creep. Limit the law in writing. Sunsets. No secret expansion by guidance.

The warning light

When a government makes ID checks normal “for safety,” the next politician asks for more. Today it’s porn and “harmful content”. Tomorrow it’s speech someone powerful dislikes. You can already hear the trial balloons: if this gate works, why not another. Why not fewer rights, since “people are idiotic”. That is not safety. That is conditioning.

The wider slide

Talk of scrapping human rights protections fits the same mood. If you normalise gates, you normalise gatekeepers. And they rarely stop at one gate.

The Hermit take

Protect children. Keep adults free. Build safety where it works: in homes, in design, in courts that chase criminals, not in databases that profile the lot of us.

Keep or toss

Toss ID-at-the-gate for lawful adults. Keep private-by-design safety and real platform duties.

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Sources

• UK Government – Online Safety Act: explainer (child safety codes, timelines): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer
• UK Government – Online Safety Act collection (duties, July 2025 child safety start): https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/online-safety-act
• Ofcom – Age assurance guidance / statements (implementation, “highly effective” checks): https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/age-assurance and https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/protecting-children/statement-age-assurance-and-childrens-access
• ICO – Age assurance opinion (privacy risks and compliance): https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/information-commissioners-opinions/age-assurance-for-the-children-s-code/
• Ofcom – Children and parents: media use and attitudes 2024–2025 (how kids actually use and circumvent): https://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-use-and-attitudes/media-habits-children/children-and-parents-media-use-and-attitudes-report-2024
• Open Rights Group – Regulating age verification and How to fix the OSA (civil society critique): https://www.openrightsgroup.org/publications/regulating-age-verification/ and https://www.openrightsgroup.org/publications/how-to-fix-the-online-safety-act-a-rights-first-approach/
• EFF – Blocking access won’t protect children (risks to privacy and access): https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/blocking-access-harmful-content-will-not-protect-children-online-no-matter-how
• Context on broader rights erosion debate (Farage/HRA): https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2025/08/28/nigel-farage-wants-to-abolish-the-uk-human-rights-act-of-1998/